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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
DeSumma, the defendant in this criminal case, asserts 
that the pistol seized from him as a consequence of his 
non-Mirandized statement was "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
and, therefore, should have been excluded from evidence. 
We reject that contention because suppressing evidence 
derived from a voluntary but unwarned confession serves 
neither the goal of deterring coercive police misconduct nor 
the purpose of ensuring trustworthy evidence. Accordingly, 
the conviction will be affirmed. 
 
A jury convicted defendant on one count of conspiracy, 
four counts of extortion in the collection of extension of 
credit in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 894(a), and use of a 
firearm during the commission of a crime in violation of 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c). He was also found guilty of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 922(g). 
The District Court sentenced defendant to fifty-one months 
imprisonment on the extortion counts, and imposed a 
mandatory consecutive sixty months on the gun possession 
charge. 
 
Defendant acted as a collector for one Peter D'Amelio, 
intimidating individuals who had defaulted on loans or 
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submitted bad checks. In January 1998, D'Amelio and 
defendant appeared at the offices of brothers Andy and 
Gary Shull in Huntingdon Valley, Pennsylvania, to confront 
them with the fact that $40,000 in checks that they had 
written had proved to be worthless. After some heated 
discussion, defendant drew a handgun and fired a shot 
past Andy Shull's head and into the wall behind him. 
 
The Shulls then agreed to work with the FBI in their 
investigation of D'Amelio and defendant. Six months later, 
defendant met with the Shulls at a restaurant in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After searching the Shulls for 
recording devices, defendant warned them not to cooperate 
with the authorities against D'Amelio or himself. He also 
reminded the Shulls of the January 1998 shooting incident, 
and threatened them with harm if they turned on him. 
 
Over the next two months, defendant met with the Shulls 
on several occasions and renewed his threats to kill them 
if they did not pay the money they owed D'Amelio. The FBI 
then secured arrest warrants for D'Amelio and defendant. 
 
On September 29, 1998, a five-man FBI surveillance 
team observed defendant drive his automobile into the 
parking lot of a club in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and 
park near the door. One agent entered the club and 
announced that there had been an accident in the parking 
lot involving the defendant's car. Defendant then went out 
to the lot, and when he was within a few feet of his car, the 
FBI team surrounded and arrested him. 
 
One of the agents handcuffed defendant and conducted a 
pat-down search to determine if he carried any weapons. 
Failing to detect anything, an agent asked defendant if he 
had any weapons or firearms in his possession. Defendant 
replied that there was a weapon in his automobile and gave 
the agent the pad combination to open his car door. 
 
Until this point, the agents had not displayed any 
firearms, used any force or threats, nor had they given any 
Miranda warnings. The agents opened the car and retrieved 
a loaded pistol from a briefcase. 
 
The District Court conducted a suppression hearing, 
during which the government presented the testimony of 
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one of the FBI agents who had been at the scene. The 
government offered no evidence that the agents knew 
defendant was carrying a weapon or had access to one. Nor 
did the prosecution present any testimony that the agents 
were aware of the defendant's previous use of a firearm. 
 
Based on this evidence, the Court found that because 
Miranda warnings had not been given, the defendant's 
statement that a gun was in his car should be suppressed. 
Rejecting the government's contention that the public safety 
concerns expressed in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984), were applicable, the trial judge said this was a 
"routine arrest scenario." 
 
The Court, however, ruled that the pistol itself was 
admissible and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine did 
not apply because the defendant's statement was voluntary, 
albeit inadmissible, under Miranda. Relying on Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court observed that a 
Miranda breach does not necessarily preclude the use of all 
evidence flowing from the infraction. Moreover, this Court 
had observed that Elstad rejected the proposition that the 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, announced in Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), applied to 
Miranda violations. United States v. Johnson , 816 F.2d 918, 
922-23 (3d Cir. 1987). Finally, the District Court concluded 
that the defendant's voluntary statements provided 
probable cause to search his car. See United States v. 
DeSumma, 44 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Pa. 1999). 
 
During the sentencing proceeding, D'Amelio testified that 
just before the start of trial, defendant threatened him with 
death if he testified for the prosecution. Based on this 
testimony, the District Court found that defendant had 
obstructed justice and, therefore, added a two-point 
increase to the offense level. 
 
On appeal, defendant contends that the District Court 
erred by admitting the pistol into evidence. He also argues 
that the Court violated Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 
466 (2000), by adding a two-point upward adjustment to 
the offense level for obstructing justice in the absence of a 
jury determination on that point. 
 




In Wong Sun, narcotics agents arrested the defendants in 
their homes without probable cause or reasonable grounds. 
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 473-78. The Supreme Court held 
that because Fourth Amendment violations had occurred, 
the evidence stemming from those arrests must be excluded 
from the trial as "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 488. 
 
The defendant in Elstad gave an incriminating statement 
before receiving Miranda warnings. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300- 
01. Later, after having been advised of his Miranda rights, 
defendant gave a written statement that was introduced at 
trial. Id. at 301-02. The Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant's contention that the second confession was the 
fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 308. The Court explained 
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary 
rule is "to deter unreasonable searches, no matter how 
probative their fruits." Id. at 306 (emphasis added). The 
Miranda exclusionary rule, in contrast, serves the Fifth 
Amendment and applies more broadly than the Amendment 
itself. Id. Thus, a voluntary statement that would be 
admissible under the Amendment may be barred because 
of the lack of a Miranda warning. 
 
The Court explained that the Fifth Amendment bars the 
prosecution from using compelled testimony in its case in 
chief because the failure to administer Miranda  warnings 
creates a presumption of compulsion. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
306-07. Consequently, even unwarned voluntary 
statements are excluded from evidence. Id. at 307. The 
Court continued, however, "the Miranda presumption . . . 
does not require that the statements and their fruits be 
discarded as inherently tainted." Id. at 307. A defendant 
whose confession is inadmissible may not "enjoy the 
freedom to `deny every fact disclosed or discovered as a 
"fruit" of his confession' . . . ." Id .; see also Harris v. New 
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 n.2 (1971) (rejecting defendant's 
request to suppress such evidence as an "extravagant 
extension of the Constitution"). 
 
Elstad emphasized that "[v]oluntary statements remain a 
proper element in law enforcement" and admissions of 
guilt, "if not coerced, are inherently desirable." Elstad, 470 
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U.S. at 305 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The 
element of police misconduct is not a factor that comes into 
play when the prosecution uses a voluntary statement. 
 
Applying the Wong Sun fruits doctrine where the evidence 
is obtained as the result of a voluntary statement, would be 
inconsistent with deterring improper police conduct and the 
goal of assuring trustworthy evidence. Id. at 308. No 
constitutional violation occurs in such a situation unlike 
the circumstances where an unreasonable search occurs or 
a coerced confession is obtained. 
 
Johnson relied on Elstad in holding that "[w]here a 
subsequent confession is obtained constitutionally, the 
admission of prior inadmissible confessions was harmless 
error." Johnson, 816 F.2d at 923. We summarized Elstad as 
"specifically reject[ing] the proposition that the `fruit of the 
poisonous tree' doctrine, which in the fourth amendment 
context requires the exclusion of evidence or confessions 
obtained as a result of a constitutional violation, extends to 
violations of the Miranda decision." Id. at 922. 
 
Other cases are in accord. See United States v. Elie, 111 
F.3d 1135 (4th Cir. 1997) (derivative evidence obtained as 
a result of a voluntary unwarned statement not fruit of the 
poisonous tree); United States v. Mendez, 27 F.3d 126 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (derivative evidence admissible); United States v. 
Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); 
United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 
1988) (same). But see United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 
405, 410 (1st Cir. 1998) (applying the fruits doctrine `where 
there is a substantial nexus between [Miranda ] violation in 
the second statement, where the second statement is not 
itself preceded by an adequate Miranda warning'). 
 
After the District Court entered its judgment in the case 
before us, the Supreme Court held in Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), that Miranda  was a 
constitutional rule that Congress could not supersede 
legislatively. 530 U.S. at 444. Defendant seizes on 
Dickerson's ruling, arguing that the pronouncement of 
Miranda's constitutionality casts doubt on the earlier cases 
denying suppression of derivative evidence. He emphasizes 
that the opinions refusing to apply Wong Sun referred to 
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the fact that Miranda was only "prophylactic" and not 
constitutional. 
 
We cannot agree with the defendant's reading of 
Dickerson because the Supreme Court appeared to 
anticipate and reject it. The Court explained that"[o]ur 
decision in [Elstad] -- refusing to apply the traditional 
`fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases -- 
does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional 
decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable 
searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from 
unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." 530 
U. S. at 441. 
 
Dickerson thus continued to observe the distinction 
between Miranda's application to cases involving the Fifth, 
rather than the Fourth, Amendment. Ultimately, the Fifth 
Amendment prevents the use of the non-Mirandized 
statement rather than the introduction of derivative 
evidence. 
 
We hold that the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does 
not apply to derivative evidence secured as a result of a 
voluntary statement obtained before Miranda warnings are 
issued. Thus, even though the defendant's seized gun was 
secured as a result of his non-Mirandized statement, it was 
properly admitted. 
 
Our holding makes it unnecessary to decide whether the 
evidence was admissible under Quarles. In that case, the 
defendant was wearing an empty holster when he was 
apprehended, prompting the officer to ask him where the 
gun was. 467 U.S. at 652. Defendant nodded in the 
direction of some empty cartons and said, "the gun is over 
there." Id. The Supreme Court held that both the statement 
and the gun were admissible because Miranda does not 
apply where the public's safety is threatened. Id. at 656-59; 
see also id. at 667-74 (O'Connor, J). (discussing admission 
of the gun itself). 
 
In the case before us, the government did not introduce 
any evidence that the FBI knew of the defendant's violent 
propensities or that he had used a pistol to intimidate the 
Shulls. Nor did the government introduce evidence at the 
suppression hearing that the agents were aware of the 
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crime for which defendant was being arrested. So far as the 
record here reflects, the arresting agents were not advised 
that the defendant was any more dangerous or violent than 
a person accused of a typical Ponzi scheme. The 
government furnished no evidence that there was any basis 




In sentencing the defendant, the District Court imposed 
a two level increase pursuant to United States Sentencing 
Guideline 3C1.1, which provides for such enhancement if 
the defendant willfully obstructs the administration of 
justice during the course of an investigation, prosecution or 
sentencing. In addition to threatening D'Amelio, the 
testimony at trial reveals that the defendant similarly 
attempted to intimidate the Shulls and performed body 
searches on them. 
 
Defendant contends that the obstruction issue should 
have been submitted to the jury in accordance with 
Apprendi. There, the Supreme Court held that"any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 490. This Court has since concluded, however, 
that when the actual sentence imposed does not exceed the 
statutory maximum, Apprendi is not implicated. United 
States v. Williams, 235 F.3d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 2000). In 
addition, Williams stated that Apprendi  did not purport to 
limit the factors that a sentencing judge could consider in 
imposing a sentence below the statutory maximum. Id.; see 
also United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 
2001) (Apprendi claim nonexistent where ultimate sentence 
is less than that which would have been authorized by jury 
verdict). Here, the sentence fell well below the statutory 
limit and, accordingly, was permissible. 
 
The defendant's contention that he was entitled to have 
the obstruction of justice issue submitted to a jury must 
fail because he was not convicted of that crime. Although 
his conduct resembled this offense, it was simply relevant 
conduct that had a bearing on the appropriate sentence. In 
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this respect, the District Court properly exercised its 
discretion in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be 
affirmed. 
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